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Abstract: The present research sets out to reach a better understanding of the determinants 
of Business Angels’ active involvement in making BANs accomplish diverse functions and 
building cognitive resources and shared competencies.  We propose a framework where 
angels’ human capital and cognitive process (in terms of predictive vs. control-oriented 
behavior) are key in explaining their degree and type of involvement with diverse BAN 
activities. To test the related assumptions, we conducted a questionnaire survey with a 
regional French Business Angel Network. 
 
In the market for entrepreneurial finance, specific investor categories have been shown to play 
distinctive roles for the success and performance of young entrepreneurial ventures. Two 
generic investor categories appear to be especially prevalent in contributing growth capital to 
entrepreneurial ventures: formal venture capital firms (VCs) and Business Angels (BAs).   
Business angels can be defined as “private individuals using their own money, directly in 
unquoted companies in which they have no family connection” (Harrison and Mason, 1999). 
They make an important contribution to closing the equity gap for early stage ventures, where 
uncertainty is high and funding needs are below formal VCs’ investment threshold. Beyond 
money, BAs have been shown to contribute to young ventures’ growth and success in various 
ways, based on their specific knowledge, skills and cognitive process. It has been argued, for 
instance, that BAs contribute “their skills, knowledge and contacts in a variety of informal 
and formal roles” (Harrison and Mason, 1999, p. 95). Such value adding roles consist of 
acting as a sounding board for entrepreneurs in developing their strategy, supervision and 
monitoring, resource acquisition and mentoring (Politis, 2008). In fact, empirical results from 
Wiltbank (2005, p. 355) make a case for the role of active angels in venture success. Research 
on the antecedents of active BA involvement is still scarce, but existing results indicate the 
importance of certain cognitive features. For instance, some BAs reach an intuitive grasp of 
                                                          
1 Bonnet is from Grenoble Ecole de Management, Wirtz and Cohen are from University of Lyon-Jean Moulin 
(Magellan Research Center). 
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particular ventures’ growth opportunities, due to their personal experience and knowledge 
(human capital), and then are able to translate their perception into professional investors’ 
predictive language (decision-making style), helping raise additional growth capital (Bonnet, 
Wirtz, Haon, 2013). Others directly influence a venture’s success or failure through their 
specific investment behavior. Wiltbank et al. (2009) have shown that BAs whose decision 
making style is non-predictive but highly control oriented2 have lower failure rates than their 
highly predictive counterparts but invest on average in smaller ventures with lower rates of 
return in case of success. Being control-oriented, they closely interact with the entrepreneurs 
and potentially exert direct influence on young ventures’ strategic trajectory and managerial 
capabilities. Human capital and cognitive features characterizing individual BAs, be it in 
terms of knowledge and skills or in terms of decision-making style, are thus relevant for the 
type of angel involvement and, ultimately, young ventures’ growth and success. 
The market for informal venture capital, however, features a very high degree of information 
asymmetry, which makes it difficult for early stage start-ups to match with the appropriate 
angels. That is why, in an effort to narrow the equity gap, there have been numerous 
initiatives since the late 1990ties to develop formal business angel networks (BANs). An early 
example is Silicon Valley’s Band of Angels founded in 1994. In Europe, the number of 
operating BANs has increased dramatically. According to EBAN (2014), the number of 
BANs rose from 66 in 1999 to a total of 468 in 2014 (84 of which in France alone, most of 
them with a regional outreach). The setting up of organized BANs has been partly sponsored 
by public policy initiatives in an attempt to make the informal capital market more efficient 
by raising the awareness and visibility of potential angel investment and by reducing 
information asymmetry through various matching events (Arnoudt and Erikson, 2002; 
Collewaert et al., 2010; zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal, 2008). The inception and 
spread of BANs can thus be qualified as a significant phenomenon characterizing the 
dynamics of the contemporary informal venture capital market. The functions of BANs have 
changed over time, from offering mere matching services to act as syndicates providing due 
diligence, deal structuring and post-investment services, as well as contributing to educate 
BAs and entrepreneurs (Gregson et al., 2013; Lange et al., 2003; Mason, 2006). Zu 
Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal (2008) hence identify four generic functions which BANs 
                                                          
2 Control-oriented decision making is a cognitive style close to Sarasvathy’s concept of effectuation. While 
predictive individuals base their decisions mainly on ex ante predictions of decision outcomes, control-oriented 
decision makers do not rely on such a priori estimates but make decisions based on the perception of their 
capacity to subsequently influence a project and its performance in various ways while (even unanticipated) 
events unfold, based on whatever resources (skills and knowledge) they possess.  
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may typically assume to various degrees: (1) mobilize and select capital seeking ventures and 
BAs, (2) match ventures and BAs, (3) allow for networking among investors and service 
providers, (4) provide consulting services (competency building) to angels and/or 
entrepreneurs (including education of angels and entrepreneurs, post-investment monitoring 
and resource provision…). The latter function indicates that BANs are potential knowledge 
and skill enhancers for their members and the ventures they invest in. In an environment of 
scarce resources, the capacity of a BAN to assume its potential functions depends on the 
active involvement of its members. Though BANs frequently employ some administrative 
and managerial staff (“gatekeepers”) (Paul and Whittam, 2010; Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and 
Westphal, 2008), anecdotal evidence shows that in many BANs deal selection, due diligence 
and post-investment monitoring largely rely on a small number of active volunteer members. 
This can also be assumed to hold true for building up network-specific competencies by 
leveraging individual angels’ human capital. Active BAs can thus be assumed key in a BAN’s 
success to deliver added value to its members. However, though BANs tend to offer a broad 
range of services, which implies complex tasks, research on the factors driving their efficacy, 
on their internal organization and management, and on the way they mobilize the 
competencies of their members is still scarce. 
Not all BAs share the same cognitive features or are equally involved with their ventures. If 
being actively involved at different stages in the investment process plays a role in venture 
performance, we may presume that a BAN’s value added ultimately depends on those 
members who are active. In other words, for a BAN to be efficacious, it is not necessary that 
all its members play an active role. The intensity (time spent) and type of involvement (due 
diligence, board participation, mentoring, etc.) of some network members are likely to have a 
bearing on the type of outcomes (low failure rates of many small size ventures, some big 
successes in large scale ventures, member satisfaction, …) of a network’s overall activity. 
Testing this assumption is beyond the scope of the present paper and needs further research. 
At this stage, the best we can do is to look at member satisfaction with their network as a 
crude proxy of its efficacy. Our goal is more modestly to understand the intensity and type of 
involvement of BAN members. Who are the active angels and what explains their 
involvement?  
We believe the present paper is the first aiming at reaching a better understanding of the 
determinants of BAs’ active involvement in making BANs accomplish diverse functions and 
building cognitive resources and shared competencies.  We propose a framework where 
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angels’ human capital and cognitive process (in terms of predictive vs. control-oriented 
behavior) are key in explaining their degree and type of involvement with diverse BAN 
activities. To test the related assumptions, we conducted a questionnaire survey with a 
regional French Business Angel Network.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief literature 
review on the state of BAN research. Section 2 develops a model of BA involvement in 
diverse network activities/functions. Based on earlier research on angel cognition (Bonnet et 
al., 2013, Wiltbank et al., 2009), it is argued that the contribution to certain network activities 
by individual angels is influenced by the more or less predictive and/or control-oriented 
character of their decision-making style and by angels’ human capital. In order to test the 
model, we analyze the data gained from a questionnaire survey conducted on a regional 
French BAN. Section 3 reports descriptive data from the survey, which show how network 
members perceive the extent to which the BAN actually accomplishes its generic functions. 
Section 4 reports the results of the tests of individual BA involvement in providing various 
network services. 
1. A review of BAN activities 
According to Becker-Blease & Sohl (2011, p. 715), “Business angel networks or groups [...] 
are comprised of angels who join with other angels in an organized form. Groups provide a 
method for angels to pool resources, reduce search and transaction costs, and mitigate 
adverse selection and agency costs”. However, the functions of BANs have changed through 
time. While first generation networks were merely providing matching services between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs, a growing number of BANs now act as groups in which deal 
selection, due diligence and deal structuring are shared between members and co-investment 
is quasi-systematic (Gregson et al., 2013; Mason, 2006).  
Following a review of the literature, we propose to classify BAN activities into five broad 
categories: (1) matching and deal selection, (2) deal syndication, (3) due diligence, deal 
structuring and post-investment services, (4) training and professionalization of angel 
investors and (5) BAN governance and management.  
1.1 Matching  and deal selection 
In a market characterized by significant information gaps between entrepreneurs needing to 
raise equity and potential angel investors, matching SMEs with BAs has historically been the 
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raison d’être of BANs (Mason, 2006). BANs make angel investors visible to entrepreneurs, 
which is particularly valuable for the less active investors who do not have a name or 
reputation in the entrepreneurial community (Aernoudt et al., 2007). Matching is done 
through company presentation events, newsletters or the internet (Aernoudt, 2005; EBAN, 
2014). To improve matching effectiveness, most BANs select entrepreneurial projects, and 
sometimes coach entrepreneurs, in order to ensure that only high quality and investment-ready 
projects are presented (zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal, 2008). Would be angel 
network members are also selected, although the degree of selection varies significantly 
between highly selective syndicates counting a small number of high net worth members 
(Mason, 2006) and larger, more open networks based on geography, common industry 
experience or education.  
There is no academic consensus on the effectiveness of BANs as matching devices. It is 
recognized that BANs have considerably contributed to raise awareness on angel financing, to 
increase angel investment activity (Aernoudt et al., 2007, Mason and Harrison, 2002) and to 
alleviate information and financing problems for young entrepreneurial companies 
(Collewaerdt et al., 2010). However, it seems that some BANs fail to provide enough good 
quality deals to their members and do not succeed in attracting enough angel investors, as 
Mason and Harrison (2002) have shown for “first generation” BANs in the UK. Adverse 
selection issues have also been documented. Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal (2008) 
contend that, when they help young ventures to become investment ready, BANs may blur the 
signals that enable angel investors to identify the best projects. However, the view that BANs 
attract low quality deals is not confirmed by the empirical results of Collewaerdt et al. (2010). 
1.2 Syndication 
Since BAs have limited time and financial resources, syndication between them is highly 
relevant. Syndication allows BAs to access larger deals, to diversify their investments and to 
learn from angels with more investment experience (Aernoudt, 2005). Although it may be 
done informally outside organized networks, BANs offer appropriate conditions to co-invest 
as they allow investors to meet regularly, to create social ties and trust, to gain access to the 
same investment opportunities and share experience and knowledge of various industries 
(Christensen, 2011; Mason, 2006). While syndication between angels is generally viewed as 
having a positive economic impact by contributing to reduce transaction costs and to mobilize 
funds from less experienced angels (Mason, 2006), we lack empirical data on its extent and 
impact. According to EBAN (2014), 67% of BANs offer syndication services, but the 
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proportion of investments that are actually syndicated is unknown. San José et al. (2005) 
mention that syndication is still underdeveloped in Europe compared to the US. In the UK, 
Mason (2006) notes a rapid increase of the proportion of syndicated deals in BANs between 
the mid-90s and 2003. Syndicated deals correspond to various types of situations: packaged 
investments offered to investors operating independently from each other, ad-hoc deal-
specific syndicates formed by BANs, and organized angel syndicates or funds (France 
Angels, 2015; Mason, 2006). 
In addition to offering co-investment opportunities with other angel investors, some BANs are 
also part of co-investment schemes with government supported VC funds aiming at 
complementing angel funding with public funds.    
1.3 Due diligence, deal structuring and post-investment services 
In 2002, Mason and Harrison noted that UK BAs were often dissatisfied with the quality of 
investment proposals they receive and frequently fail to negotiate acceptable terms and 
conditions with entrepreneurs. They called for the emergence of a second generation of BANs 
that would offer due diligence, pricing and deal structuring services in addition to a mere 
introduction to investment opportunities. The rationale in offering theses services is to 
increase the probability of the completion of a deal (Aernoudt et al., 2007) and to share costs 
and expertise between angel investors. There is evidence that 50% of European BANs now 
propose these services (EBAN, 2014). According to Mason (2009), one third of BANs 
operating in the UK in 2008 were commercially oriented networks offering due diligence and 
negotiation services. Although data on post investment services is scarce, anecdotal evidence 
shows that BANs and syndicates frequently delegate members to the board of directors or to 
the strategic committees of investee companies, in order to monitor management and to 
provide resources such as strategic advice and mentoring.  
While the proportion of BANs offering value added services such as due diligence, deal 
structuring and post-investment services has increased in recent years, the long term viability 
of these networks has been challenged. As Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal (2008) 
contend, the presence of experienced serial angels is necessary for a network to provide value-
added services and to attract unexperienced virgin angels. However they note that the more 
experienced angels may not need services that they have the ability and/or the preference to 
perform themselves.  
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1.4 Training and professionalization of angel investors 
An important limitation to the development of the informal VC market lies in the fact that 
unexperienced “virgin” angels often do not master the risk-analysis of a young venture and 
the process of an equity investment. They therefore encounter difficulties in making their first 
investment even if they have the desire and the financial capacity to become an angel investor 
(Aernoudt, 2005; Mason and Harrison, 2002). Experienced angels also recognize that they 
need to improve their investment skills (San Jose et al., 2005).  
BANs may play an important role in providing training to BAs. According to EBAN (2014), 
87% of European BANs provide training for investors. Mason (2009) indicates that training is 
mostly offered by second generation BANs (i.e. providing more than matching services) since 
the 2000’s. In addition to organizing training sessions for members, BANs, as well as their 
national federations, contribute to professionalize angel investing by designing formal tools 
such as due diligence check lists, company valuation models, codes of venture-governance 
(France Angels, 2011). 
Some BANs also offer training services for entrepreneurs in order to make their firms 
“investment ready” (Mason, 2009). The objective of these programs is to increase the number 
of investable deals that BAs receive, as many entrepreneurs lack a good comprehension of 
investors’ expectations and selection criteria (Mason and Harrison, 2002). However, these 
programs have been criticized as having a potential adverse selection effect by attracting low 
quality deals (Christensen, 2011) and by deteriorating the signaling quality of business plans 
and management presentations (zu Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal, 2008).  
1.5 BAN governance and management 
The governance and management of BANs relate to activities that are usually performed by 
the networks’ boards of directors. They include tasks such as monitoring the network, 
contributing to strategy formulation, and gathering external financial and non-financial 
resources. The latter includes actions such as building a network of partners at a local or 
national level (other BA networks, VC firms, banks, professional service firms, public 
authorities, trade associations) and lobbying on legal and tax issues. These actions aim at 
enlarging the deal flow and the investment capacity, and at securing financial resources for 
the network. 
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2. A model of BA involvement in BAN activities 
The literature review on BANs shows that angel networks provide a variety of services. Most 
of them are ultimately related to different mechanisms of venture governance: creating deal 
flow potentially enhances the efficiency of the informal venture capital market and thus 
influences ownership and control, due diligence allows for ex-ante monitoring by reducing 
information asymmetry, board representation potentially enhances post-investment 
monitoring and strategic advice, etc. However, BAN activities are often presented in purely 
empirical terms and a significant proportion of the related literature remains highly 
descriptive. In order to better understand the active involvement of individual angels in 
various BAN activities, it is helpful to create theory-based categories. To make some progress 
in this direction, we suggest to refer to recent analyses of governance that integrate a strong 
cognitive component, since most BAN activities are more or less directly related to young 
venture governance and investors at the seed stage face particular cognitive challenges related 
to conditions of strong uncertainty (Wiltbank et al., 2009). Governance can be broadly 
defined as all mechanisms which govern the conduct of top managers and entrepreneurs. As 
such it is a complex multilevel system (Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007; Charreaux, 2008; 
Wirtz, 2011): diverse mechanisms, some specific to a venture (e.g. the board of directors), 
others more general (e.g. the market for control), interact dynamically and play various roles. 
More specifically, the actors involved (BAs in our case) may assume disciplinary, cognitive 
and/or behavioral roles when they get involved in governance.  
Since we want to understand BA involvement, the unit of analysis of the present research is 
the individual BA. With respect to a BAN, individual angel involvement may actually 
concern two distinct levels of analysis: (1) involvement in the governance and management of 
the network itself and (2) direct involvement in the governance of specific target ventures. 
Involvement at either level may eventually enhance BAN efficacy. The first level has an 
impact on the more or less smooth functioning of the network and the acquisition of shared 
competencies, whereas the second level is likely to have a bearing on the network’s 
investment outcomes.  
Moreover, the literature on governance roles, be it in general terms or more specifically 
focused on an entrepreneurial setting, teaches us that involvement in governance activities can 
take on different forms and make the governance mechanisms play different roles (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989; Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007). Hence governance can act as a behavioral, 
cognitive, or disciplinary lever (Charreaux and Wirtz, 2006; Wirtz, 2011). Standard 
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explanations of governance heavily rely on agency theory (Daily, Dalton, Cannella, 2003) to 
help understand the involvement in discipline-enhancing governance activities, as a 
consequence of economic incentives based on the rationale of maximizing expected utility 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (predictive logic). Resource- and knowledge based theories 
(Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) show that, depending on their 
individual knowledge and skills (human capital) and on their cognitive characteristics, the 
actors of the governance process shape collective learning and resource acquisition in an open 
world where future outcomes are co-constructed collectively. Based on the preceding 
discussion, we propose a typology of BAN activities according to two dimensions: (1) 
governance level (network/venture) and (2) governance role (financial discipline/cognitive 
lever). 
Figure 1- A Theory-Based Typology of BAN Activities 
 Venture governance BAN governance and 
management 
Financial discipline and 
information management 
(theory background: standard 
financial modelling based on 
a predictive logic of rational 
expectations and maximizing 
expected utility in risky 
environments: agency 
theory) 
- Deal selection and 
matching 
- Due diligence 
- Deal structuring 
(price and contracts 
negotiation) 
- Post investment 
monitoring (financial 
reporting, …) 
- Deal flow 
- Forming and 
managing angel 
syndicates 
- Creating formalized 
information-based 
tools (due diligence 
checklist, code of 
venture governance 
…) 
- Monitoring of 
network activities and 
gathering external 
resources (board 
participation) 
Skill enhancement and 
knowledge management 
(theory background: 
conceptualize the joint 
construction of idiosyncratic 
(cognitive) resources in 
uncertain environments: 
resource- and knowledge 
based theories, effectual 
logic) 
- Strategic advice 
- Post-investment 
mentoring 
- Training seminars for 
members (BAs) 
- Participation in the 
formulation of BAN 
strategy (board 
participation) 
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Financial discipline is achieved through various monitoring mechanisms and incentive 
schemes which are meant to reduce agency costs and thus enhance value, when a young 
venture sells outside equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; van Osnabrugge, 2000). 
Accordingly, angel involvement in disciplinary governance at the venture level concerns 
activities such as due diligence, financial reporting, etc. Angel involvement in cognitive 
venture governance may take on the form of strategic advice given to the entrepreneur and 
post-investment mentoring. At the BAN level, the network’s board members may play 
different roles according to circumstances: angels who serve as directors play a cognitive role 
when they are involved in the formulation of BAN strategy. They exert financial discipline, 
when they monitor network activities. Consequently, active involvement in BAN boards can 
serve both, disciplinary and cognitive purposes. Contributing to deal-flow is, in the first 
instance, an information related matter. It helps the BAN in reducing information asymmetry 
for its members. The organization of training seminars at the BAN level potentially enhances 
the network’s collective skills and knowledge, it is consequently a cognitive activity. 
Now that we have characterized different activities related to BAN governance and 
management, how can the involvement of individual BAs in different BAN activities be 
explained? 
For a participant in the governance process (an individual BA) to be able and willing to 
assume certain disciplinary and/or cognitive roles, his specific human capital (knowledge and 
skills derived from education and experience) (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) and cognitive 
process (decision making style) (Wiltbank et al., 2009) can be expected to be of great 
importance. Hence, to get involved in exerting financial discipline presupposes the existence 
of financial incentives and a decision making style which is in line with the economic 
rationale of expected utility maximization (predictive). Being able to contribute relevant 
cognitive resources may depend on specific human capital, and also on certain cognitive 
predispositions. In fact, especially in the context of young ventures, cognitive process features 
which allow an individual to decide under conditions of strong uncertainty (Sarasvathy, 2001) 
may explain certain forms of involvement. 
Wiltbank et al. (2009) show that BAs’ decision-making style influences their investment 
behavior and the way they get involved with the ventures they invest in. Based on 
Sarasvathy’s work on effectuation, they propose two measures of decision-making styles: 
prediction and control orientation. A predictive approach to decision making means that an 
individual’s cognitive process and decision making strongly rely on formal tools helping to 
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predict future outcomes. Typically, that is the way investment decision making is taught in 
standard courses of finance, where the rational decision-maker is supposed to choose 
investments that maximize net present value. Decision making thus heavily relies on ex-ante 
prediction according to the rationale of maximizing expected utility. Highly predictive 
individuals need access to all relevant existing information helping them to make 
unambiguous predictions from objective data. 
H1: At the level of venture governance, predictive BAs get more involved in disciplinary 
activities and information management than non-predictive BAs (deal selection, due 
diligence, deal structuring …). 
H2: At the level of BAN management, predictive BAs get more involved in the establishment 
and promotion of standard tools for venture governance (due diligence checklist, governance 
code of best practice …) than BAs with a weak prediction orientation. 
Control-orientation is a different approach to decision making, although it is not necessarily 
opposed to prediction. Certain individuals can score high on prediction and on control-
orientation. Others, however, are non-predictive and control oriented. The latter adapt to 
circumstances as events unfold. They are not trapped in static ex-ante reasoning, but make 
decisions based on their perception of the possibilities of active intervention whenever 
necessary, making the best of the existing resources in given circumstances. What is more 
important to control-oriented individuals than reliable predictions about future outcomes is the 
perception that they have the capacity to actively influence the course of events, even though 
the latter may not be anticipated, as is the case in highly uncertain environments3. It can hence 
be supposed that control-orientation favors continuous direct intervention in various activities. 
H3: Strongly control oriented BAs spend more time in BAN activities than individuals with 
weak control orientation. 
Control orientation implies the possibility of continuous interaction, hence 
H4: At the level of venture governance, strongly control oriented BAs get involved in post-
investment activities. 
                                                          
3 Concerning the distinction between risk and uncertainty, the interested reader may refer to Knight (1921). 
Rational expectations and the ability to maximize expected utility suppose the existence of a risky 
environment. In fact, risk means that possible future states of the world are known and can be assigned a 
probability distribution. Under conditions of strong uncertainty future states of the world are not predictable. 
Standard financial tools are based on the notion of risk but not Knightian uncertainty. 
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H5: At the level of BAN governance, strongly control oriented BAs get continuously 
involved with the board of the network. 
Where predictive decision making strongly relies on the prospects of future returns 
established on the basis of existing information, control-oriented individuals (effectuators) 
rely on their personal resources and adapt to unpredicted circumstances as events unfold. This 
may in turn favor a focus on the development of specific cognitive resources. 
H6: Control-oriented BAs get more involved in skill enhancement and knowledge acquisition 
than those who score low on control-orientation. 
The will and motivation to get involved in BAN activities is one thing, the ability to do so 
another. Individuals differ with respect to human capital and the latter influences the 
capability to perform various activities. The acquisition of human capital (knowledge, skills, 
competencies) depends on education and training, as well as on-the-job experience (Becker, 
1964). It is reasonable to assume that BANs tend to use rationally the competencies of their 
members. Therefore we can expect that network members whose education or experience 
grants them specific capabilities to perform given activities will tend to get more involved in 
such activities. Past research on formal VC suggests that finance experience helps investors 
with analyzing the financial projections proposed by the venture seeking funds and with 
having a good understanding of the valuation and deal structuring process (Dimov and 
Shepherd 2005; Walske and Zacharakis 2009). It is reasonable to suppose that BA 
involvement in the exercise of financial discipline and the limitation of potential agency 
conflicts is enhanced by the acquisition of a strong culture in standard finance. Therefore: 
H7: Having acquired financial experience or training is positively related to the exercise of 
disciplinary governance activities (due diligence, deal structuring, …). 
Certain cognitive BAN activities, such as the formulation of BAN strategy, mentoring and the 
provision of strategic advice to entrepreneurs etc. most likely require specific managerial 
skills. A strong previous experience in the formulation and conduct of strategy, as an 
entrepreneur, top manager or CEO may be considered to be especially helpful in this respect. 
H8: A strong strategic experience positively influences BA involvement in cognitive 
activities (formulation of BAN strategy, providing mentoring and strategic advice to 
entrepreneurs, …). 
13 
 
3. BAN functions, BA involvement and cognition: descriptive statistics from the 
survey 
In this section we present our data collection method, sample features, and descriptive 
statistics.  
 
3.1 Data collection and overall sample features 
a. Data collection 
A questionnaire containing a total of 35 questions was posted on Monday, February 9, 2015 
on the internet. The link to the questionnaire platform was sent to members of Business Angel 
Network Savoie-Montblanc Angels (SAMBA). This BAN is located in the Rhône-Alpes 
region. The region is known for its dynamism and intense entrepreneurial activity and hosts 
some of the larger and more dynamic angel networks in France. 
The survey instrument covers four types of data: the individual characteristics of business 
angels (age, gender, …), their overall and specific satisfaction with network services, their 
involvement in specific BAN activities, and their decision making style and human capital 
features (dimensions of prediction and control, as well as experience in strategy, marketing, 
finance, as a CEO, as an entrepreneur). Appendix 1 contains a summary of the principal 
variables measured through the questionnaire. The initial survey instrument was developed 
and discussed with the director of the Savoie-Montblanc network and ourselves and pretested 
by four network members. 
The survey was conducted online with Qualtrics survey software. Initially an e-mail invitation 
to participate in the study was sent by network managers to the members. A reminder was 
sent approximately six weeks later.  
At the closure of the online survey, the total number of respondents was 85. Thirty-nine 
responses were incomplete, taking the exploitable sample to 46 Business Angels. The total 
population of SAMBA network members is estimated to be 197 which results in a response 
rate of approximately 23%. This is consistent with prior studies investigating business angels 
networks in the US and the UK. 
b. Sample features  
Our respondents’ characteristics are close to those reported in earlier studies in France 
(Bonnet and Wirtz, 2013). They are mostly men (93.5%) and they are 59 of age on average.  
82% of them hold a degree of higher education (master level for 52 % of them and doctorate 
level for 30 %). 63 % of them are professionally active (entrepreneurs account for 24 %) and 
37% of BAs are retired. They are at 76% subject to wealth tax. 
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c. Investment  
80% of the 46 respondents have at least made one investment, and 76% of respondents have 
made their investment inside the BAN. Since their first investment, BAs have on average 
primarily invested via a network in 3 ventures. Beyond directly investing in individual 
ventures they have also invested once or twice (average of 1.67) in funds organized by the 
network (SIBA, Business Angels Investment Fund). 
The cumulative investment per active angel in our sample (total since he/she started to invest) 
is below €25,000 for 8% of respondents; 41% indicate investing between €25,000 and 50,000; 
32% indicate investing between €50,000 and 100,000, and only 8% above €500,000. For 
investments made via BAs networks: None of the BAs surveyed think they will multiply by 
more than 2 the value of the capital invested.  42.86 % believe this multiple to be between 1 
and 2. 37.14 % recover roughly the amount invested and 20 % think they will get back less 
than the amount invested. For investments made by BAN members outside their networks: 
13.64 % of Business Angels surveyed think they will multiply by more than 2 their initial 
investment and 13.64 % believe this multiple to be between 1 and 2. 45.45 % recover roughly 
the amount invested and 27.27 % think they will get back less than the amount invested. 
 
3.2 Overall satisfaction with network services 
38 out of 46 respondents are satisfied or totally satisfied with their network; Angels who are 
actively involved and those who are passive are equally satisfied (mean score of satisfaction 
=4.09 on a five-point scale). Member satisfaction may be considered as a crude proxy for 
value-added. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that a high score of satisfaction implies that 
respondents perceive added value in a BAN.  
Beyond overall satisfaction, we can observe 35 out of 46 respondents who find that the 
network has made progress in terms of professionalization over the last 10 years and for 21 of 
them, this is one of the reasons that actually led them to join a network. 
 
3.3 Satisfaction with respect to specific network services 
Satisfaction depends on the delivery of certain network services. It was measured on a five-
point scale for various items. BAs assess the benefits (or services) of their network by the 
number of investment opportunities (3.96) and quality of the investments (3.78). For BAs, the 
network gives them the tools needed for a more rational approach to investment (4.13) and 
contributes to the fact that the activity of BAs has a greater recognition by public authorities 
(4.2), by entrepreneurs (4.09) and other finance professionals (4.02). BAs consider their 
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investor role as a provider of knowledge and skills. They benefit from other members’ 
experience and skills (4.04). BAs consider that their network contributes to local economic 
development (4.39). Table 1 summarizes the responses with an average score above 3.5. 
 
Table 1- Satisfaction with BAN services (on a five point scale) 
Statistic Mean Standard deviation 
  
The BAN allows me to have access to a greater number of  investment opportunities 3.96 1.25 
The investment opportunities offered are of good quality  3.78 0.99 
The details given by the network on the evolution of changes in tax regulation are helpful 
to me 3.87 1.38 
Being a member of  the network allows me to develop my personal contacts 3.91 0.86 
The network contributes to local economic development 4.39 0.65 
I can bring my experience and expertise to the network 3.70 0.94 
I can get benefit from the experience and expertise of other network members 4.04 0.63 
The network plays an active role in the recognition of Business Angels by financial 
professionals (banks, venture capitalists… ) 4.02 1.2 
The network plays an active role in the recognition and the legitimacy of Business Angels 
to the public and public authorities 4.2 1.09 
The network plays an active role in the recognition of Business Angels by entrepreneurs 4.09 1.09 
The network provides tools and services that enable a rational approach to investment (due 
diligence, assessment methods, shareholder agreements, good governance charter.) 4.13 1.11 
 
3.4 BA involvement  
Network services that underpin member satisfaction are to a large extent provided by certain 
members themselves. Services and the resulting satisfaction are hence likely to depend on 
active BA involvement. Not all BAs are however equally involved. Involvement in network 
activities in terms of overall intensity (number of days/time spent in network activities) and 
type of involvement are generally heterogeneous. 54.3% of responding angels can be 
considered as strongly involved, investing at least 6 days per year in BAN activities. There is 
also heterogeneity concerning different types of involvement. 97.83 % of BAs attend 
company presentation events at least once a year. A much smaller proportion of BAs bring 
investment opportunities (30.43 % contribute to deal flow), participate in the pre- selection of 
investments ( 41.30 %) and get actively involved in due diligence (47.83 %). 41.3% 
participate in post-investment monitoring. Table 2 summarizes the percentage of yes/no 
respondents for the various activities. 
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Table 2 – Involvement in BAN activities 
  Answers % Yes % No 
1 Deal flow: You bring investment opportunities. 30,43% 69,57% 
2 You attend at least once a year company presentation events  97,83% 2,17% 
3 You attend at least once a year training sessions 60,87% 39,13% 
4 Formal pre selection : You contribute to the pre selection of investments 41,30% 58,70% 
5 Due diligence: You contribute to due diligence concerning investments 47,83% 52,17% 
6 You lead training sessions for members 8,70% 91,30% 
7 Post investment : You take part in the post-investment supervision of ventures 41,30% 58,70% 
8 You are a member of the board of your network 26,09% 73,91% 
9 
You are a director or member of the investment committee of a fund organized by  your 
network  
 
19,57% 80,43% 
 
 
Table 3 (below) establishes a correspondence of the items measured in table 2 with our 
theory-driven typology of BAN-activities described in Figure 1. The corresponding items in 
table 2 are indicated in parentheses; i.e. due diligence activity is measured by item 5 of table 
2.  
 
Table 3- BAN-activity-typology  
 Venture governance BAN governance and management 
Financial discipline and 
information 
management 
 
- Due diligence (5) 
- Formal pre-selection of 
potential deals (4) 
- Post investment monitoring 
(7) 
- Deal flow (1) 
- Monitoring of network activities 
 BAN board participation (8) 
 BAN general meeting (2) 
 BAN-fund investment 
committee and board (9) 
Skill enhancement and 
knowledge management 
 
 
- Post-investment mentoring 
(7) 
- Training seminars for members 
(BAs) (3,6) 
- Participation in the formulation 
of BAN strategy (board 
participation) (8) 
 
3.5 Decision making style and human capital 
 Decision making style 
The items used to measure prediction (4 items) and control (2 items) were developed based on 
the literature (e.g. Wiltbank, Read, Dew and Sarasvathy, 2009; Bonnet, Wirtz and Haon, 
2013) and selected to fully capture each concept. According to Bonnet et al. 2013, they are 
formative. We used a five-point Likert scale and respondents rated their agreement or 
disagreement with each item.   
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The following items are formative measures of prediction. Mean scores for our sample feature 
in parentheses.: 
- When you evaluate a venture’s strategy, you study the strategy of competitors 
(mean 3.76) ; 
- When you gather information on the project, you study expert forecasts. (mean 
3.61) ; 
- When you look at the forecasts for the project, you use them to establish the net 
present value of the company (discounted cash flows). (mean 3.33) ; 
- You base your decision to invest on the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project 
(mean 3.2).  
Control orientation was measured by the following items:  
- When assessing the venture’s strategy, you think about the way you can contribute 
to it. (mean 3.61) ; 
- You base your decision to invest in the project on the value added that you are able 
to deliver through your  accompaniment of the company (mean 2.78) 
The descriptive statistics for these variables featuring the percentage of high prediction and 
high control individuals (measures of at least 4 on the Likert scale) are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics for high prediction and control  
Prediction oriented Agree strongly 
agree Percent 
Total 
Responses Mean Median 
When you gather information on the project, you 
study expert forecasts. 23 10 71,70% 46 3.61 4 
When you look at the forecasts for the project, you 
use them to establish the net present value of the 
company (discounted cash flows). 
23 5 60,90% 46 3.33 4 
When you evaluate the venture’s strategy, you 
study the strategy of competitors 25 10 76,00% 46 3.76 4 
You base your decision to invest on the internal 
rate of return (IRR) of the project 17 3 43,50% 46 3.20 3 
Control oriented Agree strongly 
agree Percent 
Total 
Responses Mean Median 
When assessing the venture’s strategy, you think 
about the way you can contribute to it. 20 11 67,40% 46 3.61 4 
You base your decision to invest in the project on 
the value added that you are able to deliver through 
your  accompaniment of the company 
10 5 32,60% 46 2.78 3 
 
Descriptive statistics show that there is heterogeneity among angels concerning decision 
making style. Although a strong proportion of BAs within the BAN have a highly predictive 
approach in their investment decisions, that is not the case for all of them. Depending on 
items, the proportion of respondents scoring high (minimum of 4 on a five-point scale) on 
prediction varies between 43.5% and 71.7%. Proportions of highly control-oriented 
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individuals are 67.4% or 32.6%, depending on which item is considered. So we can conclude 
that not all angels of our sample share the same cognitive process when it comes to 
investment decision making. Highly predictive angels share a quasi-rational decision-making 
style, where investment decisions follow a logic of maximizing expected utility, whereas 
angels that are non-predictive and strongly control-oriented act as effectuators. Heterogeneity 
in our sample in terms of angels’ cognitive process is an interesting result in itself, which may 
have important consequences for BAN members’ behavior. Earlier research has shown that 
decision making style has an impact on investment-target profile and investment outcomes 
(Wiltbank et al., 2009) and on BA co-investment with professional VC-funds, the most 
predictive BAs being the ones that are most likely to invest alongside professional VCs 
(Bonnet, Wirtz, Haon, 2013), since they are able to communicate in the same conceptual 
language of standard financial economics. In the following section, we will test if 
heterogeneity in decision making style of individual BAs also has an impact on the inner 
workings of BANs.  
 
 Human capital  
« Professional experience », a basis for the acquisition of human capital, was measured by 
asking Business Angels to report the number of years spent in each function. We then 
considered that to have acquired a significant experience in a certain function, on-the-the-job 
experience of at least one year is required. We hence created a series of binary variables 
coded 1 if there was a certain experience (for example as an entrepreneur or a CEO) and 0 for 
no such experience. The variable “entrepreneur” is coded (1= worked as an entrepreneur over 
one year / 0= worked less than one year as an entrepreneur), based on BAs’ answers. Table 5 
indicates summary statistics of respondents with certain human capital features: strategy, 
marketing, finance CEO, entrepreneur. As reported in earlier research (Bonnet, Wirtz & 
Haon, 2013), many BAs have an entrepreneurial background. Indeed, 21 of our respondents 
(45.65%) declare having an entrepreneurial experience (N=46) and 78% have an experience 
as a CEO. 
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Table 5 - Type of functional experience (=human capital feature, coded 1 if at least 1 year of 
work experience)  
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
CEO 36 78,26% 
Strategy 10 21,74% 
Marketing 16 34,78% 
Finance 19 41,30% 
Entrepreneur 21 45,65% 
n =  46   
 
We observe heterogeneity in the professional experience of BAN members. Slightly less than 
half of our sample angels feature an entrepreneurial experience (approximately 46%). Almost 
80% have significant experience as a CEO. In terms of functional experience, marketing and 
sales (approx.. 35%) and finance (approx.. 41%) represent a significant proportion of BAN 
members. In the following section, we will test the impact of various human capital features 
on BA involvement in their network and in specific network activities. Are there specific 
human capital features that favor strong involvement more than others? 
4. Testing the model 
We ran logistic regressions to test the impact of decision-making style and human-capital 
features on individual BA involvement in BAN activities. Involvement was measured by (1) 
its intensity (total time spent in all BAN activities) and (2) actual involvement in each specific 
type of BAN activity (binary variables) (cf. figure 1). 
Table 6 – Test results for intensity of BA involvement in network activities (strong 
involvement when number of days per year > 12) 
  Estimate Std. Error Wald df P.-value 
Predictive BA 0,223 0,734 0,092 1 0,761 
Control oriented 
BA 2,015 1,111 3,292 1 0,07 
Strategy 
experience 3,245 0,916 12,54 1 0 
Marketing 
experience 1,361 0,745 3,337 1 0,068 
Finance 
experience 0,452 0,719 0,395 1 0,53 
 
Three variables turn out to be significant in an explanation of strong involvement. We observe 
that strong control orientation favors strong overall involvement in network activities at the 
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7% level (p-value 0.07). This is consistent with hypothesis 3. Professional experience in 
strategy and marketing-related functions also significantly enhances strong involvement in 
BAN activities. 
If we look at logistic regression results for involvement in specific BAN activities, control 
orientation turns out to be a significant explanation at the 10% level for BAs joining the board 
of the network (Wald = 2.74; p-value = 0.098). This is consistent with hypothesis 5. 
In terms of human capital features, a work experience in marketing and sales appears to be the 
single most important predictor for involvement in the following BAN activities: pre-selection 
(Wald = 7.023; p-value = 0.008), due diligence (Wald = 4.102; p-value = 0.043), and post-
investment follow-up (Wald = 4.336; p-value = 0.037). This may be explained by the 
relevance of a marketing and sales experience for the evaluation of the potential and success 
of young ventures’ products and services on the market, which is hardly surprising. 
Besides marketing and sales, the only other human capital feature that turns out to be 
significant for a specific BAN activity, namely the participation on the board of a BAN 
investment-fund, is experience in the finance profession (Wald = 5.152, p-value = 0.023), 
which is not surprising and partially confirms hypothesis 7. 
No other variable turns out to be significant. 
 
Conclusion 
In our sample, the involvement of BAN-members in their network’s activities at various 
levels is explained by a strongly control-oriented decision-making style as well as by human 
capital features related to experience in strategy, marketing and sales. Control orientation 
hence appears to be a significant driver of a BAN’s operations and efficacy. Surprisingly, a 
strongly predictive decision making style does not appear to have a significant influence on 
specific information-oriented BAN activities (such as due diligence, etc.). The corresponding 
hypotheses could not be corroborated. One possible explanation for the absence of a 
significant relationship between a predictive decision-making style and disciplinary and 
information-related governance activities may reside in the increasing professionalization of 
BAN services over the past decade that is perceived by respondents, as indicated in our 
descriptive results. Professionalization most likely led to adopt certain information-related 
governance practices and tools (due diligence, etc.) as the network’s standard best practice, 
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independently of Angels’ individual cognitive features. That may have been different at the 
network’s origin, where it is reasonable to assume that individual member-characteristics had 
a strong bearing, due to a lack of yet to be established organizational routines. Testing this 
assumption is of course beyond the scope of the present research and needs further 
investigation. Qualitative longitudinal case studies of the development process of one or more 
BANs may bring new insights.  
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Appendix 1 - Inventory of dependent and explanatory variables 
Category  Variable 
Decision making style 
(explanatory) 
Prediction (multi-item formative 5-point Likert scale; individuals are 
considered highly predictive if they score above median) 
 
Control orientation (multi-item formative 5-point Likert scale; individuals 
are considered control oriented if they score above median) 
 
Human Capital features 
(explanatory) 
 
Type of functional experience (coded 1 if at least one year of experience, 
0 otherwise) 
CEO  
strategy,  
marketing,  
finance,  
entrepreneur 
BA involvement 
(dependent) 
Type of involvement (1 if involved 0 if no involvement) 
- Deal flow  
- BAN general meeting  
- Training seminars for members (BAs)  
- Formal pre-selection of potential deals 
- Due diligence  
- Post investment monitoring  
- BAN board participation  
- BAN-fund investment committee and board  
Intensity of involvement 
- Number of days per year spent in the activities of the BAN 
Less than 12 days per year = low intensity (0) 
At least 12 days per year = high intensity (1) 
 
 
